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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. New York Life Ins.
Co. v. Dodge (1918) 246 U. S. 357; Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Dunken (1924) 266
U. S. 389; see Comment (1925) 38 Harv. L. Rev. 826. The Court also men-
tioned impairment of the obligation of contract and the full faith and credit
clause in New York Life Ins. Co. v. Head (1914) 234 U. S. 149. The com-
merce clause was applied to nullify a telegraph mental anguish statute in
Western Union Tel. Co. v. Brown (1914) 234 U. S. 542. But see Fox v. Postal
Tel. Cable Co. (1909) 138 Wis. 648, 120 N. W. 399, where Wisconsin law
was applied in a suit for the negligent transmission of a telegram from New
York to Chicago. The application of the due process clause is probably pref-
erable in that it is less restrictive upon the courts. The chief value in bring-
ing such cases into the federal courts would be uniformity of conflict rules.
See Note (1930) 40 Yale L. J. 291. After all, uniformity, rather than the
intrinsic superiority of any particular rule, is the real aim of conflict of laws.
N. P., '34.
CONTRACTS-ILLEGALITY-COMPOUNDING FELON.-Plaintiff Insurance Co.
seeks to recover $81,014.36, part of the amount paid to the Defendant Bank
under a robbery insurance contract. In the contract there was a stipula-
tion that in case of recovery of the stolen items from any source other than
insurance or security the net amount, less the actual cost of making the re-
covery, should be applied to reimburse the insured in full for the loss, and
the excess, if any, should be paid to the insurer. Part of the stolen items
were recovered as a result of negotiations with the criminals on the part of
both the Insurance Co. and the Bank, whereby the robbers received $140,000.
The lower Court refused to allow the Insurance Co. a recovery on the grounds
that the contract whereby the items were recovered from the robbers, was
void as against public policy and R. S. Mo. (1929) see. 3894, Fidelity and De-
posit Co. v. Grand National Bank of St. Louis (D. C. 8, 1933) 2 F. Supp. 666
---commented upon in 18 St. Louis Law Rev. 352. The bank's counterclaim
based on the expenditure of the ransom money in obtaining the return of the
stolen bonds was also held invalid.
The Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the District Court's decision on the
grounds that, the ransom contract being completed, and the recovery being
based solely upon the insurance contract stipulation, no taint of invalidity
from the ransom contract existed which would prevent the Insurance Co.'s
recovery on the Insurance contract. Fidelity and Deposit Co. V. Grand Na-
tional Bank of St. Louis (C. C. A. 8, 1934) 69 Fed. (2d) 177. In the light of
the provision in the insurance contract (supra) and the well established
principle of law that an action is maintainable as long as the illegal trans-
action is not required to establish the cause of action, Brooks V. Martin (1864)
2 Wall. 70; Thompson v. Lyons (1920) 281 Mo. 430, 220 S. W. 942, it seems
that the conclusion reached by the Appellate Court is sound. The substan-
tiating dicta, however, to the effect that the ransom contract itself is not in-
valid as against public policy in that there is no express or implied agree-
ment to suppress, stifle or stay criminal prosecution as part of the considera-
tion appears to be of doubtful application in the present case.
It is settled principle in American jurisprudence that a civil action may be
maintained against a thief to recover stolen property or its value before
prosecution. Downs v. Baltimore (1910) 111 Md. 674,76 Atl. 861, 41 L. R. A.
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(N. S.) 255; 2 Restat. of Contracts, sec. 548. And, therefore, by inference, a
ransom contract between the person robbed and the robber is not void unless
it involves the compounding of a felony or the supressing of prosecution.
Schirm v. Wieman (1906) 103 Md. 541, 63 AtI. 1056. From a practical stand-
point it is hard to see how a victim could get the criminals into Court to de-
fend a breach of the "valid" ransom contract. And it is equally difficult to
think that any Court would allow the malefactors to recover.
The District Court regarded the "ransom' contract invalid in the light of
the Missouri Statute against "Compounding Felonies" (ante) which reads
"Every person having a knowledge of the actual commission of any-peni-
tentiary offense-who shall take money or property of another, or gratuity
or reward, or any promise, undertaking or engagement therefore, upon
agreement or understanding express or implied, to compound or conceal such
crime,"-- or refrain from prosecuting or -withholding evidence, etc. The
Appellate Court held that this Statute was not broader than the Common
Law principles applicable and that, regardless, the Bank was not accepting
"property of another" or a "reward," but was only receiving back what be-
longed to it. However, the Court did not rest here; it went on to demon-
strate that the agreement between the bank and the robbers was not express,
and that, although an agreement may be implied from the evidence, facts
and circumstances (Mississippi Valley Trust Co. v. Begley (1923) 298 Mo.
684, 252 S. W. 76) yet there was nothing in this transaction to warrant the
inference that the bank had agreed to suppress prosecution or evidence, or
to interfere with the police in bringing the criminals to justice. There are
a number of presumptions that must be overcome before an illegal agree-
ment may be implied. There must be a manifestation of assent of all the
parties to the unlawful agreement. Fosdick v. Vanarsdale (1889) 74 Mich.
302, 41 N. W. 931. The presumption of good faith and proper motive al-
ways exists. Mo. Pac. R. R. v. Prude (1924) 265 U. S. 99. Where either
one of two motives may be implied, that which is honest is preferred. Alex-
ander v. Fidelity Trust (C. C. A. 3, 1917) 249 F. 1. But the reasoning of
the District Court to the effect that only one motive may be implied in a
transaction of this sort is compelling. It is difficult to conceive how the
bank in the instant case could have taken part in long and haggling negotia-
tions with the malefactors without gaining some information which would
assist the police in tracking down the criminals. The negotiation necessarily
hinged on an understanding that such information would not be divulged.
T. B. C. '35
CONTRIBuTORY NEGLIGENCE--RAILROAD CROSSINGS-THE SToP, Looic AND
LisTEN RuLu-The plaintiff approached railroad tracks in his ice truck, go-
ing slowly, and stopped about ten or twelve feet from a sidetrack. On the
sidetrack was a string of freight cars which shut off his view of the main
track to the north. He heard no bell or whistle and so proceeded across the
tracks. He was struck by a train coming from the north at a speed of about
thirty miles an hour. The District Court held he had been guilty of negli-
gence and directed a verdict for the defendant. Affirmed by the Circuit
Court of Appeals and reversed by the Supreme Court of the United States.
Held, a driver of a truck struck by a train at a crossing is not contributorily
negligent as a matter of law in failing to stop, leave the truck and survey the
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol19/iss4/17
